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An Essay Revie-wof Bennett Reifl1er's
A Philosophy of
Music Education
By Wayne Bcrw.rruarr
Brandon University
ince music educators have long
maintained that philosophy is axiomatic to the profession, rt 1S remarkable how few publications exist on the subject, how infrequently philosophical issues
are the object of professional research, and
how little time is typically devoted to its exploration in teacher-training programs (let
alone in-service professional development
efforts). The recent publication in second
edition of Bennett Reimer's book is thus a
very significant event for North American
music education. While others have shared
important philosophical visions of music
education during the past two decades,
Reimer's has clearly been the most influential. For many, philosophy of music education is virtually synonymous with the phrase
"aesthetic education," and with the positions
Reimer articulated under that banner in 1970.
It will be interesting to see whether the
philosophical reflections offered in this second
edition are as infrequently contested and disputed in the years to come as those in the first
edition appear to have been. I, for one, hope
they are not: not so much because I do not
share the Reimer vision (in some respects I
do), but because I earnestly hope the music
education profession will come to take philosophical matters more seriously in the years
ahead. If it does, we should expect to see
more debate, more evidence of disagreement,
and less inclination to conceive philosophy as
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a body of doctrine for professional consumption than has generally been the case.
Is this second edition "new"? Yes and no.
The text has been extensively revised, and
new sections (many of which will be familiar
to readers who have followed Reimer's publications over the years) have been incorporated. Reimer concedes understandable
"frustration" (xiv) at the task of revision, frustration arising from his sensitivity to the need
for greater depth in some areas on the one
hand, and his desire to keep the book readable and usable on the other. In most instances, he performs this precarious balancing act relatively well. But the position
Reimer first articulated in 1970 has not
changed "in any fundamental way:" during
the 20 ensuing years, he states, "there has
been no discovery that has led me to chart a
new philosophical direction" (xiii), While
the final chapter does strike out in a substantially new, highly controversial direction (discussed below), the book is essentially an attempt to restate with "more accuracy and
power" (xiii) ideas with which the profession
has become quite familiar over the years.
My sense is that the second edition's arguments may not always be more powerful, but
that they are often clearer. Only, this clarity
brings into focus shortcomings which apparently went undetected in the earlier version.
Assumptions and biases which were implicit
in the first edition stand out in sharp relief in
the second. One hopes this may enable readers to more effectively separate Reimer's
ideas from the persuasive rhetoric in which
they are often presented.
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Another concern which deserves careful
fine key terms or use them consistently.
Feascrutiny is the relation between the philosotures like these make for engaging and
sometimes inspiring reading, but not the best
phy and its purported implications for practice. It is, I suspect, possible to subscribe
philosophy.
Fourth, the crucial issues of muenthusiastically to many of Reimer's emisical standards and evaluative criteria are adnently sensible recommendations
for instrucdressed much later in the book than they
tional method without necessarily adhering
need to be for the typical reader; and the
to his basic philosophical position. If certain
rather cursory gloss they eventually receive is
instructional and curricular practices can be
obfuscated by a rather confusing polemic on
found to follow from other philosophical bases
elitism. Fifth, the book's philosophical orienthan those Reimer articulates,
tation is essentially monistic
and speculative: its claim to
their attractiveness should not
be applicable to all music
be mistaken for validation of
Over the years,
is neither substantiated nor,
the philosophy.
I think, warranted.
And
In what follows, I offer
all rnaririer of fanfinally, the book concludes
criticisms of what I perceive
ciful interpretawith a paradoxical vision in
to be weaknesses and inconwhich music education besistencies in Reimer's book
tions have atcomes more by aspiring to
and the vision of music edutended the slogan
less: a vision which is bold
cation it represents.
This is
but misguided. Its widenot to declare them bankru pt.
'music education
spread endorsement by the
Reimer's stature in the proas aesthetic eduprofession would both surfession is well-earned,
and
prise and disappoint me.
many features of his vision
cation,' and as
have been broadly accepted
Reirnertightly
"Many of the concepts of
and have served the profesaesthetic education remain
sion well. I trust, then, the
suggests, these
imperfectly understood and
"Reimer philosophy" is suffimay be in need
many of its implications for
ciently secure that it will not
action remain imperfectly
suffer excessively from the
of sorting out.
applied," says Reimer in his
critical scrutiny to which I
Dire need, some
introductory remarks. Yet,
propose to subject it here.
at the same time, "the genI have six basic criticisms
might say.
eral view it proposes has
of the book. First, it is diffibecome the bedrock upon
cult to shake the distinct imwhich our self-concept as a
pression that what one is
profession rests" (xi). These
reading would have been
assertions may well be true; but an imperfectly
more precisely entitled A Philosophy of Arts
understood "general" point of view hardly
Education; music is quite often conspicuous
sounds like professional bedrock. Indeed,
in its absence. As we shall see, this is no acover the years all manner of fanciful interpretacident. Second, the basic philosophical
tions have attended the slogan "music educamooring of the book remains the deeply pertion as aesthetic education," and as Reimer
plexing Langerian notion that art is an anarightly suggests, these may be in need of sortlogue of human subjectivity, and, somehow,
ing out. Dire need, some would say. Unfortua teacher of feeling-ideas
which are at best
nately, if one wishes more than an introducelusive, and at worst simply dubious. Third,
tion to the widespread confusion which so
while the first edition's troublesome circularity (aesthetic. ..is aesthetic. ..is aesthetic. ..) has
often attends the aesthetic doctrine, A Philosophy of Music Education may well be a
been attended to, other methodological flaws
disa ppointment.
remain. Instead of even-handed analysis, the
book often deploys straw-man tactics and
The book begins with the seemingly reaemotional appeals, and it fails to clearly desonable statements that "music education

"
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"The notion that art exists to convey a nonconceptual
edge of feeling, a knowledge

knowl-

which, were it not for art, would

forever elude us, is a vestige of nineteenth-century

Idealism, re-

kindled and given a life well beyond its due by Susanne Langer's
seductive prose." -- Wayne Bowman
consists first and foremost to develop every
person's natural responsiveness to the art of
music" (xii); that "the essential nature and
value of music education are determined by
the nature and value of the art of music;" and
that "the special character of music education
is a function of the special character of the
art of music itself' (1). Now never mind for
the moment that words like "responsiveness"
carry with them potential problems to which
several decades of apologizing for the doing
of music have apparently yet to sensitize us.
And never mind that the seemingly innocuous phrase "the art of music" may point us
down a rather thorny path. There are more
immediate and pressing problems. For statements like these, statements which take as
their subject music per se, are remarkably infrequent in a book promising to found its
philosophy upon the special nature and
value of music. Its focus is more often upon
the nature and value of art and of the aesthetic than of music.
The deep confusion in which the term
"aesthetic" has remained mired for years (its
extensive use, if I may, as a kind of verbal
"filler" whose primary contribution to sentences in which it is employed is as a bearer
of vaguely honorific connotations, an enhancer of apparent integrity) is a concern to
which Reimer demonstrates some sensitivity.
It is, he concedes after all, imperfectly understood. His solution is twofold. First, and
most helpful, he uses the term less frequently. His second strategy for alleviating
confusion involves the free substitution of
the terms "musical," "artistic," and "intrinsic"
(and eventually, even "expressive" [56]), for
"aesthetic," on grounds that "they usually
mean the same thing ..." (xiii),
Unfortunately, the implication that musical,
artistic, aesthetic, and so forth, are largely
synonymous is neither true nor is it helpful.
78
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Now, there may be those who find this an
unjustified point of criticism, but they probably are not philosophers. For the task of
clear definition lies at the very heart of philosophy. Confusion over the term aesthetic
can only be exacerbated by contlating it with
a host of other terms. This objection is not,
moreover, merely academic or technical. If,
for instance, musical and artistic are interchangeable terms, anything describable as
musical must also be artistic: a rather dubious assertion. And if two terms (say, musical and aesthetic) mean the same but are not
equally understood, music educators could
presumably speak more clearly and comprehensibly by eliminating one of them (preferably the less clearly understood) from their
vocabulary. In this particular case, I would
nominate "aesthetic." One of the primary
sources of the traditional confusion surrounding this term has been precisely our tendency
to use it so loosely, a tradition whose continuation Reimer apparently favors. In fairness, the second edition does employ the
term aesthetic less often, in preference for
the term art. But the fact remains, in neither
edition does the primary emphasis appear to
have been music.
Is all music art? Should it be? These questions are, unfortunately, hardly addressed:
Instead, the book discusses the nature of art
and the artistic, as if it were obvious that all
educationally worthwhile music is subsumed
by those labels. Neither the philosophical
sophisticate nor the novice can be blamed
for wondering: Whatever happened to music? Take chapter titles, for instance: Chapters 2-6 promise, respectively, to explore alternative views of art, art and feeling, creating art, the meaning of art, and experiencing
art. Even Chapter 7, "Experiencing Music,"
slips with remarkable nonchalance between
discussions of music and art as though they
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"Readers may think I'm a masochist, but Bowrnari's article gave
me a certain kind of perverse pleasure ....

It's always diverting

to tangle ~ith a formalist." -- Bennett Reimer
were for all practical purposes the same
thing. As a result, since the book has promised to explain and base its philosophical
perspective upon "the inner workings of music" (12), the reader who complains of frustration at unfulfilled promises may not be entirely without justification.
Of course, all this is no accident. Reimer
firmly believes that "all art does the same
thing and that all art can be and should be
judged by the same criteria of success" (111).
I am rather skeptical that this is true even of
all music, let alone all art-unless (as appears to be the case) the term "art" is intended to segregate certain musics from
"nonartistic" ones in a way which makes this
assertion true by definition. But never mind
that for the moment. The point is that the
aesthetic argument (even called by another
name) lures the author away from what he
set out to illuminate. Perhaps this is inevitable, given general aesthetics' preoccupation
with the generic communalities among instances of "art" and "beauty" rather than with
individual "arts," and the subtle but devastating corollary that music is unique only in its
means and material-in its distinctive way of
doing what all "the arts" (by definition) do.
If so, perhaps specifically musical aesthetics
(or better yet, philosophy of music) might
have proved a more fruitful starting point for
a professional philosophy.
On a related point, the book strenuously
argues the pragmatic utility of philosophy:
first, for purposes of advocacy, and second, as
a guide for practice. Curiously, though,
Reimer allows that "the task of philosophy is
fundamentally different from the task of advocacy ..." (8): a particularly noteworthy concession, because he so often offers his philosophy's utility for advocacy and practice as
evidence of its validity. In view of the "fundamental differences" between advocacy and
philosophy, one might well anticipate that not

nature and value would offer immediately apparent implications either for the task of advocacy or for musical instruction. It appears that
this is in fact Reimer's position: regardless of
their philosophical validity, points of view
which do not lend readily apparent support to
such nonphilosophical functions as advocacy
and instructional method are expendable.
Since, for instance, the existentialist perspective-despite "powerful insights"-does not
lend itself "directly or abundantly to problems
of mass education," it is not a dependable
base for a philosophy of music education (16).
Philosophical perspectives, then, are not to be
examined on their philosophical merits when
"selecting" one upon which to build a music
education philosophy. Rather, the criterion is
their ease of applicability to mass education.
This position seems to compromise the book's
insistence that music education take as its
point of philosophical departure the nature
and value of music, since we are apparently at
liberty to ignore those aspects of its nature and
value whose implications for school music are
indirect or perhaps disconcerting.
Even more ironically, despite the fundamental significance to music education of
music's nature and value, Reimer is prepared
to reject any philosophy which speaks more
extensively to music's nature than the nature
of "all the arts" (15): "A view confined to a
single art, even music, would be unacceptable ..." (16). In view of these assumptions,
the final chapter's troublesome recommendations are almost a foregone conclusion. But
the point here is that exclusions like these
cast serious doubt upon the sincerity of the
book's promise to present a philosophy fundamentally rooted in consideration of music's
nature .and value.
What is the basic task of philosophy? The
roots of at least some of my criticisms of this
work extend to this foundational question.
Reimer believes its mission is to pursue "that
essential, single, unifying concept" (8) which

all valid philosophical perspectives on music's

underlies all music (or, to be precise, all
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It is my contention here that this end is
achieved only by dismissing a number of important exceptions to that "universal" concept
as nonartistic aberrations. In short, while the
book maintains (8) that music education philosophy should show what is unique and
necessary about music, it fails in the former,
and its explanation of the latter is less than
convincing, if not simply wrong.
The book's manner of presentation remains
largely unchanged. For the most part, students will find its language accessible, and its
"folksy" tone inviting. But Reimer's conspicuous rhetorical skills can be something of
a double-edged sword, particularly when
they take the upper hand from systematic
logic. At times, it seems the strategy is to
brush aside important rival theories with a
rhetorical flourish, then assert and reassert
the expressionist thesis until it sounds credible. For instance, the case for absolute expressionism rests upon renunciation of
referentialism and formalism. This is
achieved by presenting these latter views in
ways which make their attractiveness virtually inconceivable: they are straw-men, deliberately flawed foils designed to allow absolute expressionism to emerge victorious.
Referential claims, for example, range from
extramusical diversions to propaganda. So
what the book calls the "most clearcut" (18)
example of referentialism, socialist realism, is
really its most extreme manifestation, the one
most easily rejected. Similarly, formalists are
intellectual snobs, elitists who in their heartof-hearts believe most people too "insensitive" to appreciate music in the esoteric way
they do (24). Now, it may well be that no
self-respecting music educator would espouse such a position; but then neither
would most musical formalists. Unfortunately, the book gives its readers few insights
into the rather compelling reasons for which
many philosophers have espoused such partial truths as these; it shoots down caricatures
deliberately crafted for that purpose.
Absolute expressionism, on the other hand,
holds "that the arts offer meaningful, cognitive experiences unavailable in any other
way ..." (28). Ironically, this is precisely the
formalist position, expressed in nonpejorative
80
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terms: whereas Reimer's formalist finds music
a purely cerebral affair, his expressionist
finds it a uniquely meaningful cognitive experience. Such ploys are neither philosophically constructive, nor are they fair to a significant and provocative body of literature on
musical aesthetics.
What is distinctive about expressionism is,
of course, its contention that art's "meaningful cognitive experiences" derive from a neeessary connection between art and feeling:
A connection which, Reimer concedes, "it
will take the rest of this book to explain"
(28). With this, the reader is delivered
straight away to the murky waters of early
Langerian theory, in which "the arts have a
special relation to feeling" (33)-an iconic or
isomorphic one which supposedly renders
music the tonal analogue of sentience-and
which is further held to establish (somehow)
that "education in the arts is the education of
feeling" (33). This is not the place to explore
logical flaws which have been conclusively
and repeatedly demonstrated elsewhere, nor
should these skeptical remarks be taken as
utter rejection of everything Susanne Langer
ever wrote. But one crucial logical error deserves mention here, if for no other reason
than the fact that it has become such an inextricable part of the belief system espoused
by North American music educators: the fact
that feeling is often implicated in art (music)
hardly supports the conclusion that feeling
and (even more importantly) its education
are art's (music's) raisons d'etre.
But these themes are fundamental to
Reimer's theory: "Creating art, and experiencing art," Reimer tells us, "do precisely and
exactly for feeling what writing and reading
do for reasoning" (33). Whatever "extra-artistic" values art may have, its "unique and essential contribution is to educate feeling as
only art, as art, is capable of doing" (4).
Now in the first place, this dichotomy between feeling and reason is far too neat and
convenient. Reason is neither so purely cerebral, nor is feeling so utterly devoid of mind
(so "purely subjective") as Reimer needs them
to be for his argument to stand. More disturbing yet, this argument seems to subtly segregate all values conceivably associated with art
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into two mutually exclusive categories: the
jeelingful, and the extra-artistic. The inference is circular, true only if one accepts feeling
as the essence of art; and this prior assumption
is not demonstrated, but simply asserted (and
reasserted) as if it were perfectly obvious to
all. To me at least, it is not.
The notion that art exists to convey a
nonconceptual knowledge of feeling, a
knowledge which, were it not for art, would
forever elude us, is a vestige of nineteenthcentury Idealism, rekindled and given a life
well beyond its due by Langer's seductive
prose. On this view, Reimer relates, art does
not arouse feeling, but reveals its dynamism
"in meticulous, specific, and exacting detail"
(43). Its concern is not this or that particular
feeling, but the essential form, the inner essence of "everything that can be felt"
(Langer's remarkable phrase): everything,
presumably, from sensation to emotion to the
workings of mind. In short, art reveals "the
nature of feeling" (SO), or more poetically,
"the subjective realm of human responsiveness" (S3); and the major function of every
work of art is to do precisely that" (SO). "Every good work of art" presents, in its "artistic
qualities," "insights into subjectivity" which
are "convincing, vital, and profound." A
work which fails to present such vital, revelatory, feelingful experience is "either bad art
or nonart" (Sl).
Little emerges from this discussion which
might be of any real guidance in distinguishing
mediocre music from masterpieces. . owhere
does the book illustrate how one might rate
actual musical compositions using the seemingly crucial notions of art and nonart. This is
an unfortunate oversight, given the book's
declaration that among the music educator's
primary obligations are the selection of "genuinely expressive music" (S3) and the illumination of "expressive content" (S4).
In the second edition of his book, Reimer
makes an admirable effort to unravel at least
one strand from the logical knot Langer
named "presentational symbolism." Turning
away from his 1970 characterization of verbal
and artistic meaning as "conventional symbols" and "art symbols" respectively, Reimer
wisely avoids that intractable symbol-whichVolume II, Number

3
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does-not-symbolize.
The new edition prefers
"conceptualization" and "aesthetic perceptual
structuring" instead (86), and is much improved as a result. The break from Langer is
far from complete, though. One still finds
remnants, for instance, of the copy-theory of
language, which conceives reference as a
function of iconic resemblance despite nowoverwhelming consensus to the contrary. To
this reviewer, it appears that Reimer's revised
theory of perceptual structuring can stand
quite well on its own-without,
that is, recourse to the notion of "discursive symbolism" and all that entails.
In any event, the basic aim of the argument remains the substantiation of a cognitive. claim for the arts, one which shows their
"special cognitive status" as "intelligent, reasoned, mindful experiences ..." (80). A perfectly reasonable statement. Only Reimer
continues that these experiences « ... yield
powerful forms of knowledge of [our] outer
and inner worlds" (80), considerably clouding an otherwise lucid and defensible position. Apparently it is assumed that all substantive or worthwhile cognitive experience
must be transitive in nature. But the value of
musical cognition per se (i.e., an "intransitive"
cognition which does not pretend to extend
beyond the music itself) seems to suffer severely in such a scheme.
Reimer quotes Philip Phenix to the effect
that what is distinctive about percepts is their
immediacy, their specificity, their nature as singular, particular, and therefore nonconceptual
forms. But ever since Kant first cont.rasted aesthetic "judgments" with conceptualization, it
has been obvious that an aesthetic which is
utterly nonconceptual is profoundly shallow.
It worked for Kant, of course, because he was
concerned in the first instance with natural
beauty rather than art. Only in music, concepts almost always play an essential role in
the experience, and when they do not, we
must be prepared to find people doing silly
things like faulting plainsong for its lack of a
good beat, or fugue for its lack of Iyricismvery philistine judgments, indeed. Conceptual
understanding is neither so mechanical and
abstractive, nor is musical understanding so
immediate and conceptless as Reimer would
have us believe.
81
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"The student for ~hom

this book is a first venture into a be~il-

dering field has little recourse but to acquiesce to [Reimer's) argument: After all, ~ho -warits to be an elitist?"-- Wayne Bo'wrnari
OW, to be fair, the book does strive to
show how "thinking about" is essential to the
full experience of art. Only, in the aesthetic
"moment," our conceptual knowledge functions nonconceptually:
it is thus a "noticing
without naming," a mental structuring of perceived events "but not according to concepts," a process of "perceptual integration"
(108). This is one of the more lucid sections
of the book, but try as I may, I cannot see
how this account necessarily implicates any
further claim to "the inner feelings of human
life as lived and experienced" (93). Such
feelings can never be named (indeed, words
are "worse than useless" [109] in their description), and the only aspect of the experience which can be "conceptualized and
therefore taught objectively and systematically" (09) is perception.

The book's sometimes proselytical tone becomes most pronounced when Reimer turns
his attention to that arch-nemesis of democracy, "elitism." Again, the book scarcely considers the merits of competing views: those
which might hold, for instance, that music
education necessarily consists in cultivation,
and in the quest of excellence. Instead, it
mounts a remarkable attack upon those (formalists?) who supposedly believe that "aesthetic experiences are for some people" (111)
rather than for all, and the apparently insidious
corollaries of this position, that 0) the same
evaluative criteria are not applicable to all art,
and (ii) "some human feelings are serious and
some are not" (111).
The argument is confusing. And this confusion is compounded by the book's failure, at
this point nearly half-way through, to enlighten the reader as to what these critically
important, universally applicable evaluative
criteria might be. The student for whom this
book is a first venture into a bewildering field
has little recourse but to acquiesce to the argument: After all, who wants to be an elitist?
But there are more severe problems. Aes82
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thetic experience, Reimer holds against this
misguided elitist, is a "hardy weed, growing
abundantly and sturdily wherever humans
exist" (10), a claim which might well lead
one to ask why, this being the case, its education is so terribly crucial. Perhaps it is not
so much a weed as a precious cultivar. And
perhaps its most precious specimens are, after all, only for some people: namely, for
those who have developed their (aesthetic?)
perceptual capacities to the fullest. It is difficult to see how one can believe otherwise
and still maintain that "musical tastes can be
improved, that musical tastes can be deepened" (134). What Reimer apparently intends, then, is simply that everyone has some
degree of innate aesthetic sensitivity whose
nourishment is an educational obligation. In
this, the elitist might well concur.
Elitists, the argument continues, advocate
the use of different standards for evaluating
different art, whereas, "if they had any respect
for art as art they would realize that all art
does the same thing ...and should be judged by
the same criteria" (111). The qualities which
make a work of art good apply to all art, "no
matter its style" (144). The (heroic) populist,
on the other hand,
accepts one set of criteria for excellence in art,
insists that the criteria be applied across the
board. but also insists that works in each
kind ...of art be judged in terms of its [sic] excellence relative to the characteristics inherent in
that kind (112).

The populist further insists that art and artists "must be judged for excellence relatively
to what they are creating" (112). Yes. But
how is this to be construed as the application
of only one set of criteria?
Matters are further complicated by a rather
remarkable assertion: "to insist on studying
nothing but the monuments of music
literature ...is to deprive a great many people of
any musical satisfaction at all and to expect
that all musical experience should be at the
deepest level of involvement" (141). I doubt
Reimer means what he appears to say here-
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"Bo'wrnarr's formalism is now-here more evident than in his defensiveness about my criticisms of elitism. I really pushed his
button on this one." -- Bennett Reimer
that the masses would be deprived of musical
satisfaction were their experiences confined to
masterworks-for that would be as condescending and patronizing a position as any
elitist, real or imagined, has ever maintained.
All the same, Reimer's "populism" apparently only goes so far: "a vast wasteland of
musical inanity exists in the popular music
field," he declares (144). The argument does
not continue, as it did in the former edition,
that it is largely misguided to judge popular
music ("as a whole") by musical standards
(1970, 107); and yet if one insists all music
does the same thing, it seems clear enough
that one must concede that some does that
thing better, some worse, and perhaps some
hardly at all. Presumably this would qualify
as the application of one set of criteria, but it
does not sound very "populistic."
The most direct escape from this labyrinth
would appear to be the simple concession
that not all art (music?) aspires to do or be
the same thing, thereby repudiating the notion that the same criteria apply everywhere.
One cannot, without a serious lapse in logic,
simultaneously maintain that music be
judged relatively (to its style) and absolutely
(as music). And there is relatively little danger that conceding multiplicity and relativity
will transform one into an elitist.
After 118 pages devoted to explaining the
nature of art, of the artistic, of the aesthetic,
of feeling, and of expression, the book turns
to musical experience. And at last the reader
is apprised of those universally applicable
criteria which seemed so crucial to understanding earlier discussions. The "four criteria for assessing the quality of any art work"
(no, not music, but art work) are: craftsmanship, sensitivity, imagination, and authenticity
(134). Craftsmanship is "the expertness with
which the materials of art are molded into
expressiveness:" at its best, it has "something
almost spiritual about it," and without it one
encounters "skill devoid of heart" (135), SenVolume II, Number 3
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sitivity is the artist's (the work's?) "intouchness" with feelings, the "depth and
quality of feeling captured in the dynamic
form of a work;" in its absence, one encounters only "the surface of feeling," or "immediate gratification" (136). Imagination "deals
with the vividness of an art object:" it is what
"grabs us," what "captures our feelings"
(137). And authenticity concerns the "honesty," the "morality" of art-a "fidelity to its
inner needs" which, when we experience it,
somehow "ennobles" our humanity (138-9).
Taken together, these four criteria illuminate
"the inner integrity of the expressive core in
a piece of music," its "truth to feeling" (140).
Now, we are all sympathetic to the complexity of defining concrete criteria for estimating musical value. But since the value of
music is supposed to be one of the two pillars on which both the advocacy and the doing of musical education stand, one might
have hoped for something rather less poetic
here: something, say, applicable by the average music educator to an actual piece of music. Despite an undeniable surface appeal,
neither the universality, nor the utility, nor,
indeed, the meaning of these criteria is at all
clear: hardly a propitious state of affairs for
a cornerstone of musical education.
Reimer's argument would be far more cogent had he chosen to demonstrate the application of these criteria to several actual
pieces of music. If every piece selected and
every instructional decision is indeed a reflection of one's assumptions about music's
nature and value, this is hardly the place for
vagueness and vagary. Moreover, if these
criteria are indeed universal, their application
to a variety of markedly contrasting musical
styles would be instructive. Discussion of
Charles Leonhard's well-known distinction
between "good" and "great" music, for example, was greatly enhanced by its illustration: in fact, his examples may have been
more revealing than the principle they were
intended to demonstrate. Reimer's criteria,
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"[SJincethe value of music is supposed

to be one of the two pil-

lars on which both the advocacy and the doing of musical education stand, one rnigbr have hoped for something rather less poetic here [regarding the judging of music]: something, say, applicable by the average music educator to an average piece of rrrusic."--Wayne Bowman
then, remain rather nebulous, if not simply
arcane. They are supposedly applicable to
all music, but the book applies them to
none. Of course this hardly establishes that
the task cannot be done. But since the book
has grounded all musical value in feeling,
and indeed, in feeling of a kind which (by
definition) defies all description, the task of
differentiating genuine musical value from
mere personal preference or "taste" is too
critical a matter to be left unexplored.
A brief personal commentary may help
clarify the nature of my objections here. Obviously, I do not share all of Reimer's basic
assumptions. I would prefer to see music
evaluated purely in terms of what it aspires to
be, what it is, instead of what it is "analogous" to, or how "deeply" it makes one feel.
I believe that music has many values, not
one (aesthetic, or artistic), or even four. I
believe personally that musical education
earns its place in the schools to the extent it
is conceived and pursued as value education.
I believe that musical education is not so
much about feeling, however globally defined, as about music. I do not believe, personally, that music (or anything else for that
matter) has "intrinsic" value, but that all value
is grounded. As such, I conceive musical
education as a quest fundamentally committed to the illumination, recognition, and understanding of musical values: values which
are multiple, diverse, divergent, and often
indeterminate. To the extent A Philosophy of
Music Education fails to illuminate this essential diversity, it may actually constrict
rather than broaden our conceptions and
perceptions of music.
In chapters eight and nine, Reimer turns to
the general music and performance programs,
respectively. These chapters are well written
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and insightful; but it is not consistently clear
how their practical conclusions are necessarily
implicated by the book's particular philosophy. On the other hand, even readers who
find the philosophy inconsistent and enigmatic
may find these chapters useful and provocative. Reimer's reputation for curricular expertise is obviously well-deserved.
Both chapters are structured after a sequential curricular model derived from John
Goodlad, consisting of seven phases: philosophy (the "values" phase), conceptualization,
systematization, interpretation, operation, experience, and expectation (152). Reimer's discussion of the nature of "musical literacy"
should be mandatory reading for a profession
gone literacy-mad. So should his critique of
faulty bases for instructional sequence, and his
argument that high school general music is
"unconscionably neglected" (180).
The chapter on performance is essentially
sound, though not without difficulties, several of which warrant passing consideration.
Reimer blames music education's lopsided
(as he perceives it) emphasis on performance
excellence on the university, with its apparently disproportionate emphasis upon private
lessons (heavy practice demands) and "performance organizations" (heavy conceit
schedules). University applied-music teachers, he explains, are "driven to turn out fine
performers," and "performers directors [sic]
are driven to present fine concerts" (198). It
is on those bases, he explains, that they are
evaluated. Reimer urges that the school music community should not be "sucked into
this professional whirlpool" (198).
This remarkable metaphor is far from benign.
ot only does it raise unfortunate
questions about school music's commitment
to musical excellence, it erects barriers where
bridges are needed: surely a great deal of
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"No'w this shocks me. It is hard for me to believe that Bo'wrnari
is that bad a musician or is that out of touch 'with the realities of
music teaching.

Has he never given a lesson? Has he never

judged a contest or festival?"--Bennett Reimer
extraordinarily effective musical education
goes on in the applied studio and in the ensemble experience. In fact, one dares suggest it is in precisely these settings that many
of our most enduring and profound musical
learnings occur.
It eventually becomes clear that the book
is not advocating the renunciation of quality
performance, only urging it be directed to
enhancing the broad musicianship, refined
sensitivity, and educational understanding
worthy of the name "curriculum" rather than
"performance-for-the-sake-of-fine-performance" 098-9). Of course the university
might well respond that this is precisely what
happens in its studios and ensembles, and
ask how Reimer thinks it possible for genuinely "fine" musical performance to occur in
the absence of significant musical learnings.
It is one thing to argue that public school
populations are younger, or less musically
"select," and that musical instruction and literature selection should reflect these truths,
but quite another to imply that university
music instruction is geared ("driven") to performance excellence in a way which is inimical to musical education. Surely university
schools of music are at least as concerned
with the development of musicality, sensitivity, understanding, and the like as are public
schools. Participation in a musical performance of superb calibre can, moreover, be
an extraordinarily influential teacher-sometimes more influential and enduring than the
particular manner in which it is prepared.
School music could do far worse than to
emulate the musicianship and educational
savvy of the many exceptional individuals
who teach music in university settings.
To be sure, there are crucial differences
between universities and public school classrooms. Any responsible teacher education
program must help students face that fact.
But a profession wishing to be known as
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"music education" rather than mere "school
music" must also accept that a great deal of
extraordinarily sensitive and effective musical
instruction occurs outside the schools, and
attempt to explore it for instructional principles applicable to a variety of musical settings. To the extent "music education" is
taken to apply only to such activities as occur in school classrooms, the name has
rather a hollow ring.
Reimer concludes his chapter on musical
performance with a plea that composition become an equal partner in the performance curriculum. This is, he argues, more nearly attainable today than at any other period in history,
given the advanced state of modern technology. The point is well taken. And yet the
preparedness of music teachers to deal with
either the technological means or the compositional process may by another matter. Musicteacher education programs will have to make
truly radical curricular changes if their graduates are to develop competence and confidence with either the electronic tools or the
creative processes Reimer has in mind. The
modest success of improvisational instruction
in jazz should alert us to the enormity of the
latter problem in particular.
These challenges should be borne centrally
in mind as one considers the remarkable thesis of the final chapter, to the effect that music education has become all it can within
the existing educational scheme of things (cf.
241), and that the way of enhancing its status
lies in becoming a fuller partner in the
broader arts-education movement. Although
it doubtless makes me one of those "narcissistic" music educators (228) who selfishly
demand more than their fair share of the curricular pie, I would argue that there remains
plenty for music education to do in getting
its own house in order before redirecting its
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sources to the overall arts-education agenda.
In one sense, of course, Reimer is absolutely correct: music education cannot help
but be strengthened by cooperative alliances
with other "arts education" enterprises. Collectively we can wield far more clout than
any of us can individually. United we stand
...and so forth. But this is not just about
clout. Beyond the obvious political advantages, the reader is told, this synergistic vision promises philosophical, psychological,
practical, and professional benefits (227-8).
If it seems self-evident that music education may traditionally have been rather parochial and self-centered, and that we need to
nurture relationships with what Reimer calls
our "sister arts," consider where the argument leads him. The way to further improving and securing our status in the school system lies not in our own "internal, bootstrap
efforts:" that is "self-deception" (223). Of
course it is essential that we continue to improve what music education is now, but it is
even more important that we work to forge a
"new vision" (226), one in which "we become an integrated part of a field that...is
larger than, more important than, more influential than we can ever be by ourselves.
That field is arts education" (227).
This conclusion comes as no surprise,
given the book's persistent equation of music
with art and the arts. But if one has come to
the book looking for what its title seems to
promise, this is more than a little disconcerting. For it seems to have concluded, albeit
implicitly, that what is needed is not a philosophy of music education, after all: a philosophy of arts education will do quite
nicely. For purposes of advocacy this mayor
may not be true; but as a guide for music instructional practice, it is precipitous in the
extreme, since its musical roots are quite
shallow. To be sure, Reimer does attempt to
reassure the reader that "the differences
among the arts are much more fundamental
than are their apparent similarities" (229).
Unfortunately, this statement sounds rather
half-hearted given the book's relentless insistence that "all art serves the same function"
(229). The music educator interested in exploring the distinctive nature and value of
music, then, may have come to the wrong
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place. According to Reimer, any value claim
one can make for music "can be made
equally validly by every other art" (227). All
the arts "have an equal right to the same
share" of curricular time, and music educators should "learn the hard lesson that our
needs must be met in the context of our
family's needs" (228).
Becoming "more generous to our own
family," Reimer promises, will yield "more
minutes per week than we have ever managed or will ever manage to cajole on our
own. We have nothing practical to lose ...and
a great deal to gain" (228). Perhaps not, if
"cajoling" is the extent of our aspiration. But
what of musical education? Despite assurances to the contrary, it is rather difficult to
interpret this appeal to "generosity" as anything but a petition for more modest musical
expectations. Although it would be nice to
have it both ways, the argument sounds suspiciously like a politician's promise to reduce
taxes and the national debt while at the same
time increasing social services.
What Reimer has in mind, ideally, is a
"general arts class" required of all K-8 students, and utilizing the "common elements"
approach (237). The class would meet an
hour each day and be taught by certified
specialists in "music, visual arts, dance, theater, poetry and literature ...film and media"
(238). Should this prove too ambitious, a
little digging could turn up community
"paraprofessionals" to fill the gaps (239).
Only, if--as the book argues-what
is good
for other arts is equally good for music, we
must presumably be prepared to see music
taught by "paraprofessionals" as well.
I would be the last to argue against better
links to existing "arts communities," or
against enhanced communication, more effective collaboration, and less provincialism
in music education. But the ideal of a music education profession with its distinctive
self-concept, goals, and standards is hardly a
narcissistic vestige of the past. And until the
unlikely day when society becomes sufficiently enlightened to allocate unlimited resources to education in all the arts, a music
education profession's first obligation must
remain musical education whatever its
"limitations ...as a separate field" (241).
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What Reimer calls the "irony" of his position is not really ironic at all. When we
adopt as our philosophical base a position
whose fundamental assumption is the similarity of all the arts, we should hardly be surprised to find it leading inexorably to arts
education. Despite the valuable insights afforded by such a perspective, it must not divert us from the prior truth that music education exists first and foremost to nurture musical understanding.
Despite its faults and blemishes, A Philosophy of Music Education contains many of the
profound insights one expects of a scholar of
Bennett Reimer's stature. There is ample
food for thought here, so long as one reads
critically rather than soporifically. All the
same, one would like to believe that the
profession's philosophical sophistication has
grown sufficiently in 20 years to justify a
more thoughtful and even-handed treatment
of issues and perspectives than this book often attempts. To those who find this assessment overly harsh and these remarks "too
picky," I can only respond that in philosophy
no less than in music, seemingly little differences usually make all the difference.
Taken collectively, the concerns expressed
in this review lead one to caution briefly
against two additional potential pitfalls inherent in this book. First, it may teach by example that philosophy need not be exacting
or rigorous, and that philosophy is simply
the expression of opinion. Second, the book
may serve (however unintentionally) to undermine the credibility of philosophy's rightful claim to pragmatic value. There is consolation in the fact that the book reaches many
valid practical conclusions, but in philosophy
as music, the process is often more important
than the product. These are not insuperable
obstacles to the book's use by musically sensitive and philosophically articulate teachers.
And after all, few philosophical books worth
reading do not require careful interpretation.
All the same, the book should probably be
approached with a high degree of (let us
say) critical objectivity.
It would be unfair and probably inaccurate
to suggest that Reimer's vision has outlived
Volume II, Number 3
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its usefulness. His many valid insights
should not be discarded because a few of
them (albeit, some fairly pivotal ones) are
flawed. One hopes, however, that this second edition may be studied more critically
and reflectively than it appears the first often
was. It would be irresponsible of the profession to give this important book anything
less than the close scrutiny it deserves, but
one dares to hope that during the next two
decades A Philosophy of Music Education will
be but one inspiring vision among a broad
array to which the profession gives serious
consideration.
Due in no small part to the influence of
Reimer (and of course, others before him), a
"philosophy of music education" has become
something every responsible member of this
profession is expected to "have." But the
profession will have taken a tremendous
stride forward when it finally comes to accept that its strength and integrity do not require that all its members "have" the same
one: that unity does not require conformity,
either on the practical or the ideological
level. ~
1992-93 FULBRIGHT VISITING
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proposals for a Fulbright grant to host a
visiting lecturer from abroad. The purpose
of the program is to initiate or develop international programs at colleges and universities by using a scholar-in-residence to
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faculty with other cultures. Preference is
given to proposals in the humanities or
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officials of the European Communities.
Deadline: November 1, 1991.
Application materials and proposal guidelines may be obtained by contacting:
Council for International Exchange of
Scholars, 3007 Tilden Street, NW, Suite 5M,
Box NEWS, Washington, DC 20008-3009
(202.686.7866).
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